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Abstract 
Today’s information tracking technology and Big Data open up new opportunities for e-
commerce. Online stores can collect personal information to estimate customers’ 
willingness-to-pay. This enables the application of price differentiation where different 
customers are charged different prices for the same product. Lower prices offered to 
customers who share the word have an advertisement effect, while higher prices have 
adverse effects. In this paper we develop a decision model for individualised prices in 
online stores that considers the sharing of prices by word of mouth which is mostly 
neglected by current literature. Complex decision models in e-commerce are caught 
between the need of adequately representing the reality and the demand of being 
solvable within reasonable time limits. We use various artificial intelligence solution 
methods to solve the decision model for numerical examples. Our results indicate that 
despite word of mouth differential pricing can be financially worthwhile. 
Keywords:  Personalised pricing, price differentiation, price discrimination, electronic 
word of mouth, reference price effects 
Introduction 
With recent years’ improvements and increased use of information tracking technology, firms are 
becoming more capable of gathering behavioural information about their customers (Chen and Chen 
2015; Aydin and Ziya 2009; Liu and Zhang 2006). The data collected in this way can be used to create 
accurate profiles that help to understand the needs of customers (Thakur et al. 2011). This process is 
facilitated by the large amounts of data generated in the age of Big Data. Accurate customer-related 
information enables firms to price discriminate between their customers such that different customers are 
charged different prices for the same product or service (Chen and Chen 2015; Bourreau et al. 2017; 
Aloysius et al. 2009; Krämer et al. 2018). Firms apply price discrimination in order to maximise their 
profit (Bourreau et al. 2017; Ghose et al. 2002). The term price discrimination has no negative 
connotation and is synonymous with price differentiation (Phlips 1983). Research on consumer welfare 
indicates that customers may profit from differential pricing as well (Bourreau et al. 2017; Richards et al. 
2016). With price differentiation firms can provide affordable prices to customers with lower purchasing 
power who otherwise would not be able to afford the good. In general, price discrimination is divided into 
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three categories: first-degree (personalised pricing), second-degree (volume discounts or bundling), and 
third-degree (group pricing) price discrimination (Bourreau et al. 2017; Chang and Yuan 2007; Varian 
1989; Pigou 1920). Personalised pricing is applied when customers are offered tailored prices depending 
on individually available information (Aydin and Ziya 2009, Shapiro et al. 1998).  Personalised pricing is 
referred to as perfect price discrimination if customers are charged exactly their willingness-to-pay 
(Varian 1989) which is defined as the maximum amount of money a customer is willing to spend on a 
product or service (Wertenbroch and Skiera 2002). Third- and second-degree price discrimination are 
already widely adopted in the real world (e.g. student discounts or bundle pricing), but there is a trend 
towards personalised pricing (Bourreau et al. 2017; Chen and Chen 2017). While volume discounts or 
bundling require the least amount of information, the adoption of group and personalised pricing is 
characterised by a significantly higher requirement for customer data (Bourreau et al. 2017). For a precise 
estimation of the customers’ willingness-to-pay, accurate customer profiles are needed. These consist of 
two parts: (1) the static customer profile based on static, long-term oriented personal data such as gender, 
age, or income and (2) the dynamic customer profile based on dynamic data concerning the short-term 
behaviour of customers in online stores including visit frequency/history, total visit duration, shopping 
cart analysis data etc. (Thakur et al. 2011; Niu et al. 2002). The more data a firm collects about its 
customers, the higher is the estimation accuracy of the willingness-to-pay and the more individualised are 
the prices offered to customers. However, the application of such pricing strategies also involves risks. A 
substantive problem of price discrimination and the resulting price heterogeneity concerns the low 
customer acceptance. A customer or a group of customers may feel disadvantaged by being offered higher 
prices (Xia et al. 2004). In the age of social media and electronic word of mouth (WOM) information 
spread faster and can reach a substantially higher level of network dissemination (Mochalova and 
Nanopoulos 2014; Pfeffer et al. 2014; Cannarella and Piccioni 2008). A high level of price transparency 
regarding other customers being privileged in terms of prices can lead to perceived price unfairness. 
Numerous incidents in the past have shown that first-degree price discrimination can initiate large waves 
of customer complaints. As an infamous example, in 2000 Amazon had been widely criticised by its 
customers for selling a DVD at different prices depending on whether cookie information was available for 
a visiting customer (Enos 2000; Bourreau et al. 2017). Recent developments have also shown that the 
acceptance of pricing based on collected data among customers is still low when it was revealed that 
Amazon changed prices up to 300 times during a few days (Hirsch 2015). As a result, WOM and the 
resulting price transparency on the market should be considered as a risk factor in the entrepreneurial 
profit maximising pricing decision. Derived from these opportunities and risks, we investigate the 
following research questions (RQ): 
RQ1: How should a decision model for price differentiation be formalised that considers customer data 
and word of mouth effects? 
RQ2: Is artificial intelligence suitable for finding adequate solutions to complex pricing decisions?   
Concerning the first research question RQ1, we develop a decision model for offering individualised prices 
in online stores. The model’s theoretical underpinning is based on findings from relevant theoretical and 
empirical literature. An appropriate pricing decision model is required to comprise the multifaceted inter-
dependencies between the store’s decision variables and the customer reaction behaviour. The resulting 
complexity of such models usually prevents analytical solutions for practical problem sizes. For numerical 
analyses, powerful solution methods are needed as found in the research field of artificial intelligence 
(AI). Therefore, as an answer to the second research question RQ2 we propose the use of an evolution 
strategy. To test the power and applicability of this method, we solve the developed decision model 
numerically for exemplary scenarios under realistic conditions as WOM is incorporated in our model. For 
assessing the quality of the results generated by the evolution strategy, we benchmark them against the 
results of other AI and non-AI solution methods. Thus, from a practitioner’s point of view, this paper 
contributes to the development and application of practical individualised pricing strategies in e-
commerce. Only a few studies have examined the effects of WOM in the relevant price discrimination 
literature (see next section). Most of these studies consider the sharing of product information but neglect 
that price information can also be passed by WOM. In our study, customers can get informed about prices 
offered to both directly and indirectly connected market participants and may react to price discrepancies 
and disadvantageous price discrimination, i.e. perceived price unfairness, in different ways. Thereby, this 
paper also contributes to price discrimination literature by providing insights into when WOM may harm 
a firm’s profit and when it may be beneficial in the presence of individualised prices.  
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The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The next section gives an overview of related 
literature. In section 3 we introduce our decision model that is solved in section 4 for numerical examples 
by various solution methods. The examined examples include various price discrimination strategies that 
are compared to uniform pricing. In section 5 a summary of the results is given, from which managerial 
implications are drawn. The section closes with limitations and future research directions.  
Related Literature 
In our approach, the prices of the seller will vary depending on a visiting customer’s static attributes and 
his/her dynamic behaviour leading to a heterogeneous price situation on the market. This paper is 
therefore closely related to the research on reference price effects which is a sub-stream of price 
discrimination literature. Reference prices are formed by customers based on market observations and 
experiences (Koschate-Fischer and Wüllner 2017). Customers use reference prices as an anchor point to 
evaluate offered prices (Kalyanaram and Little 1994; Hu et al. 2016). Hu et al. (2016) examine a monopoly 
setting where customers’ reference prices are based on past prices that are exponentially smoothed 
depending on a memory factor. The customers are strategic and profit seeking. The authors could show 
that a cyclic pricing policy is optimal for a myopic pricing strategy, where the seller only seeks to maximise 
the profits in the current period without planning strategically for future periods. The model of Hu et al. 
(2016) among others considers reference prices to be the same for all customers in each period (e.g. 
Popescu and Wu 2007; Fibich et al. 2003; Greenleaf 1995; Kopalle et al. 1996). Wang (2016) uses 
heterogeneous reference prices in his model that enables different reference prices on an individual level. 
Wang (2016) also considers a monopolistic market setting where different groups of customers have 
heterogeneous arrival schedules. Each customer has a reference price that is based on exponentially 
smoothed prices that were offered to him on previous visits. The results suggest that more frequently 
visiting customers should be charged higher prices to keep their willingness-to-pay high for later periods. 
On the contrary, for less frequently visiting customers it is optimal to extract the momentarily available 
surplus by offering lower prices. Our work is closely related to Wang (2016), but contrary to the model of 
Wang (2016) we do not limit the updating of the reference prices to store visits. Customers are able to 
obtain new information about the prices offered to other customers outside the store by WOM. Hence, we 
distinguish between internal and external reference prices. The latter is formed from information 
obtained from observing the market. Another key distinction is that the visiting schedule is not fixed per 
group, but changes on an individual level. Non-buying customers may decide on their next visit based on 
the difference between the observed prices and their willingness-to-pay.  
This paper is also related to price discrimination literature that incorporates WOM effects. In this stream 
of literature several papers have examined the optimal pricing strategy in a network of interconnected 
individuals. Most studies price discriminate based on network centrality measures and show that 
influential customers with a greater number of peers or with a more centralised position in the network 
should be offered lower prices (e.g. Bloch and Quérou 2013; Campbell 2008; Candogan et al. 2012; Chen 
et al. 2018; Fainmesser and Galeotti 2015). The discounts incentivise customers to engage in WOM by 
informing other customers of the availability of the purchasable good. Communicating with directly 
linked neighbours and all network participants are referred to as local and global network externalities 
respectively. Most of these studies implicitly assume that WOM has a solely positive effect on the firm’s 
profit by informing other customers about the product’s existence or quality. Because of this their 
research objective is often related to increasing the level of WOM in the network. The studies do not 
consider that WOM can be financially harmful as it may also be used for passing information about prices 
except for Bloch and Quérou (2013) who allow the sharing of prices only in the direct neighbourhood. It is 
conceivable that price information itself is sufficient to change the demand by either attracting customers 
to visiting the store or by dissuading them from doing so. Different prices for the same good may also lead 
to perceived price unfairness as mentioned in the introduction section. In Bloch and Quérou’s (2013) 
model, customers form their reference prices depending on the surrounding price offers and gain a 
positive utility if they get charged lower prices than their peers. The authors could show for a monopolistic 
setting that customers with a high degree centrality should be offered higher prices for increasing the 
overall demand in the network. However, the authors do not take into account that in the age of electronic 
word of mouth a customer may also get informed about the prices of distant, indirectly linked network 
participants. In the authors’ model the customer similarity is not considered either which might entail 
customers’ acceptance for others paying less. A frequent feature of papers in this stream of price 
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discrimination literature is their game theoretical approach. Most of the abovementioned studies use a 
two-staged game where at first the seller sets a price and then all market participants simultaneously 
decide whether to purchase the product. This causes challenges for adequately modelling WOM and its 
dynamics. If all customers decide on purchasing a product at the same time, the time-dependent 
information dissemination and its effects in the network are not sufficiently taken into account. To 
address this, in our model the customers act independently of one another in terms of store visits, product 
purchases, and sharing of prices via WOM. 
Author(s) Objective Degree  
of Price 
Discrimi-
nation 
Market 
Setting 
Customer 
Communication  
(Word of Mouth) 
   Findings 
Bloch and 
Quérou 
2013  
 
effects of node centrality 
on optimal discriminatory 
prices 
first-
degree 
monopoly, 
oligopoly 
customers have knowledge 
about the product 
consumption and prices in 
their local neighbourhood 
 a monopolist should charge higher 
prices to influential customers 
(hubs) if customers compare prices 
via WOM in their neighbourhood  
 in directed graphs prices are higher 
for customers who are more 
susceptible for influence  
Campbell 
2008  
 
optimal pricing strategies 
in a random network 
first-
degree 
monopoly customers tell their peers 
about the existence of the 
product depending on 
their valuation and the 
offered price; lower prices 
lead to more WOM 
 customers with a greater number of 
peers should be offered lower prices 
to increase the level of WOM 
Candogan 
et al. 2012  
 
optimal pricing strategies 
in social networks 
first-
degree 
monopoly customers pass 
information on the 
product’s quality to their 
local neighbourhood  
 
 the more influence a customer has, 
the greater is the discount 
 authors provide an algorithm for 
finding an optimal set of customers 
who should get a discount 
Chen et al. 
2018 
 
 
optimal pricing strategies 
in social networks that are 
varied in density 
first-
degree 
monopoly, 
duopoly 
customers have knowledge 
about the product 
consumptions in their 
local neighbourhood 
 in a monopoly more WOM always 
benefits the seller in terms of profits 
and prices 
 in a duopoly WOM has opposing 
effects; although more WOM 
increases demand, it also leads to 
intense competition between 
competitors leading to lower prices 
Fainmesser 
and 
Galeotti 
2015 
 
optimal pricing strategy 
and its effects on consumer 
surplus if seller uses 
information about 
customers’ susceptibility 
(in-degree) and influence 
(out-degree) in the 
network  
first-
degree 
monopoly customers know about the 
consumption of the 
product in their local 
neighbourhood and whole 
network 
 the seller should offer discounts to 
influential customers in the network 
to initiate WOM and charge the 
susceptible customers higher prices 
  
Kamada 
and Öry 
2017 
 
optimal contracting 
(bundling) in a social 
network with referral 
interaction among 
customers 
second-
degree  
monopoly customers only send 
referrals to other 
customers if their expected 
utility is greater than their 
opportunity costs 
 to increase the level of WOM, the 
seller should offer free product 
features to customers who would 
otherwise not make a purchase 
Gramstad  
2016 
 
 
optimal contracting 
(bundling) in a social 
network where the seller 
has no knowledge about its 
structure  
second-
degree 
monopoly customers know about the 
consumption of the 
product in their local 
neighbourhood  
 a share of the customers should be 
offered prices below the seller’s 
marginal costs in order to increase 
the level of WOM leading to greater 
overall profits 
Table 1. Related price discrimination studies that incorporate word of mouth effects 
Model 
Specifying the Pricing Decision Problem 
To decide on individualised prices and their consequences we consider an online store setting where a 
seller (hereafter referred to as she) offers a durable good over a finite time horizon 𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇. A customer 
(hereafter referred to as he) is denoted by 𝑖 = 1,… , 𝐼. Let 𝑏𝑖𝑡 ∈ {0,1} denote if customer 𝑖 purchases the 
product at time step 𝑡 for the individualised price 𝑝𝑖𝑡, 0 < 𝑝𝑖𝑡, that is offered to him on a store visit. Then, 
the objective function of the seller can be formulated as a maximisation problem of her total profit 𝛱 
where the marginal costs for each sold product unit are denoted by 𝑐, 0 ≤ 𝑐 < 𝑝𝑖𝑡:  
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Maximise 𝛱 =∑∑(𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝑐) ∙ 𝑏𝑖𝑡
𝐼
𝑖=1
𝑇
𝑡=1
 (1) 
The maximisation has to be done subject to the following conditions. The seller assigns all visiting 
customers to a customer group 𝑔 = 1,… , 𝐺 where 𝑔𝑖 shall describe customer 𝑖’s group. We assume that the 
seller has collected and evaluated enough information to classify her customers in regard to their 
characteristics, e.g. by using decision trees or artificial neural networks (Shim et al. 2012). Although these 
groups are disjoint, they exhibit a certain degree of similarity to each other which may result from similar 
customer-specific attributes such as age or income. For this, let 𝑠𝑔ℎ, 0 ≤ 𝑠𝑔ℎ ≤ 1, denote the similarity 
between two groups 𝑔 and ℎ with 𝑠𝑔ℎ = 𝑠ℎ𝑔. The group allocation is based on static customer attributes 
and therefore constitutes the static customer profile. A group 𝑔 has 𝑊 subgroups to which its arriving 
customers are dynamically allocated to depending on the number of their previous visits that are tracked 
by the seller. Thus, the subgroup allocation forms the dynamic customer profile. For all possible profile 
combinations of groups and visits that can occur in the two-stage profile allocation process the model 
needs to provide a specific price. These prices depict the seller’s decision variables and are summarised in 
the price matrix 𝑃𝑀 ∈ ℝ+
𝐺𝑥𝑊. The greater the dimensions of 𝑃𝑀 are, the greater is the degree of price 
discrimination. The price element 𝑝𝑚𝑔𝑤 represents the price that will be offered to a member of the group 
𝑔 on his 𝑤th visit where 𝑤 = 1,… ,𝑊 with 𝑊 ≤ 𝑇, meaning that regardless of when a customer visits the 
store for the first time, he will be offered the 1st price of his group 𝑔 (i.e. 𝑝𝑚𝑔1). If he has visited the store 
more than 𝑊 times, for any forthcoming visit he will be offered the 𝑊th price (i.e. 𝑝𝑚𝑔𝑊). Two distinct 
customers belonging to the same group can get offered different prices while simultaneously visiting the 
store because of differences in their visit history. Note that for 𝑊 = 1  and 𝐺 = 1  there is no price 
discrimination since all customers are offered the same price. For 𝐺 = 𝐼  the pricing strategy equals 
personalised pricing where each customer has his own group that has 𝑊  individualised prices. 
Consequently, 1 < 𝐺 < 𝐼  describes group pricing. Each customer is described by his time-dependent 
willingness-to-pay 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 , 0 ≤ 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 . The random visiting behaviour of customers is modelled on an 
individual level and follows a discrete distribution. On average, all customers visit the store every 𝜆, 1 ≤ 𝜆, 
time steps. Investigations regarding customer retention in online stores have shown that prices are the 
predominant factor in the customers’ choice of online retailers (Reibstein 2002). Hence, online stores use 
low prices in an attempt to attract new customers (Schmitz and Latzer 2002). From this we deduce that 
the individual duration until a customer’s next store visit, denoted by 𝜆𝑖𝑡 , 1 ≤ 𝜆𝑖𝑡 , depends on the 
difference between the customer’s 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 and his price expectations influenced by the offered price. For 
smaller differences he may return sooner anticipating an early buying opportunity, whereas large 
differences might frighten him off from revisiting the store again. On a store visit, a customer’s group 
assignment and former visiting behaviour determines the price that will be offered to him. In this context, 
let 𝑣𝑖𝑡 ∈ {0,1} indicate if a potential customer 𝑖 is visiting the store at time step 𝑡. Based on his group 
membership and the number of his earlier visits the offered price 𝑝𝑖𝑡 is defined as:  
𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝑝𝑚𝑔𝑖𝑤𝑖𝑡   ,     𝑤𝑖𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 {𝑊,∑𝑣𝑖𝜏
𝑡
𝜏=1
}  ,     ∀𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝐼: 𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 1} (2) 
At time step 𝑡 a visiting customer 𝑖 purchases the product only if his willingness-to-pay 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 is greater 
than or equal to the offered price 𝑝𝑖𝑡. However, some researchers suggest that the willingness-to-pay of a 
customer is not a fixed point, but rather a range (see Schlereth et al. (2012) for an overview). Because this 
range may vary between customers, we incorporate this into our model as an individually generated 
random parameter 𝜀?̃?𝑡, 0 ≤ 𝜀?̃?𝑡  ∀𝑖 ∈ {1,… , 𝐼: 𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 1}, that shall represent customer 𝑖’s flexibility towards 
small differences between 𝑝𝑖𝑡  and 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡  on a purchase occasion. This means, even if 𝑝𝑖𝑡 > 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡  the 
customer might still purchase the product if the difference is sufficiently low, i.e. 𝑝𝑖𝑡 −𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝜀?̃?𝑡. After 
making a purchase, the customer will not return to the store, such that ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝜏 = 0
𝑇
𝜏=𝑡+1 . Based on this, the 
purchase decision of customer 𝑖 who visits the store at time step 𝑡 can be described as:  
𝑏𝑖𝑡 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑝𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀?̃?𝑡
0 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒
  ,     ∀𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝐼: 𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 1} (3) 
Customers outside the store are not able to purchase the product: 𝑏𝑖𝑡 = 0  ∀𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝐼: 𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 0}. 
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Willingness-To-Pay Adaptation and Word of Mouth Effects 
The willingness-to-pay of a customer is not a fixed parameter and may change over time where 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖0, 
0 < 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖0, depicts a customer’s exogenously predetermined initial willingness-to-pay:  
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 + ∆𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡−1  ,     ∆𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖0 = 0 (4) 
When evaluating potential changes to their willingness-to-pay, customers are oriented to so-called 
reference prices (Koschate-Fischer and Wüllner 2017; Johnson and Cui 2013; Grunert et al. 2009). 
Reference prices are used by customers to judge the fairness of offered prices (Johnson and Cui 2013; 
Winer 1986). A reference price 𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 forms a customer’s price expectations (Mazumdar et al. 2005) and 
causes his 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 to either increase or decrease (Koschate-Fischer and Wüllner 2017; Johnson and Cui 
2013). Empirical evidence for the reference price oriented adjustment of the willingness-to-pay is 
provided by Grunert et al. (2009). In our proposed concept for the modification of the willingness-to-pay, 
the incremental change ∆𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 depicts the amount of adaptation of 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 towards 𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡. Each customer is 
characterised by an upper limit for his willingness-to-pay until which he agrees to make changes to it: 
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡+1 ≤ 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖
𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡
. In total, a customer may only change his willingness-to-pay 𝑛  times. A 
customer’s number of modifications that took place before time step 𝑡 is denoted by 𝑛𝑖𝑡. We define two 
cases for triggering a potential modification of the willingness-to-pay that differ with regard to whether a 
customer is inside or outside the store: (1) the customer visits the store and declines an offer and (2) the 
customer observes other prices on the market when activated by WOM. For this, let 𝑘𝑖𝑡 ∈ {0,1} indicate if 
customer 𝑖 is being activated by WOM and knows about at least one other price at time step 𝑡. If neither 
case (1) nor (2) occurs or if the customer has already surpassed the modification limit, there will be no 
modification of the willingness-to-pay: ∆𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 0  ∀𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝐼: (𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 0 ∧ 𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 0) ∨ 𝑛𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝑛}. If case (1) 
or (2) occurs, the amount by which the willingness-to-pay 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 changes depends on its difference to the 
reference price 𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡. Grunert et al. (2009) provide evidence that the willingness-to-pay linearly increases 
towards a higher reference price. For a lower reference price we assume that the willingness-to-pay will 
likewise decrease linearly. However, customers attach different weights to economic gains and losses 
according to the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). If the customer increases his 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡, he 
will pay more than initially intended, which can be seen as an economic loss (Johnson and Cui 2013; 
Mazumdar et al. 2005). In the converse case, the customer pays less than originally planned, which is 
perceived as an economic gain (Johnson and Cui 2013; Mazumdar et al. 2005). Due to the customers’ loss 
aversion (Mazumdar et al. 2005) it is inferable that a customer will decrease his 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 considerably faster 
than increasing it. We therefore define the slope of the linear decrease to be greater. The coefficients 𝛼 
and 𝛽 denote the slope of the linear decrease and increase respectively. For 𝛼 = 1 or 𝛽 = 1 the customer 
will immediately adapt his 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 to 𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡. We define the difference 𝛼 − 𝛽 as the degree of loss aversion. 
The parameter 𝜙 is a threshold value for the increasing case. If the customer’s price expectations denoted 
by 𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 are considerably higher than his current 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 (i.e. 𝜙 < 𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 −𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡), we assume that he will not 
increase his 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 at all. 
𝛥𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 = {
𝛼 ⋅ (𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 −𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡) 𝑖𝑓 𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 −𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 ≤ 0 
𝛽 ⋅ (𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 −𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡) 𝑖𝑓 0 < 𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 −𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝜙
0 𝑖𝑓 𝜙 < 𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 −𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡          
  , 
0 < 𝜙,     0 ≤ 𝛽 < 𝛼 ≤ 1,     ∀𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝐼: (𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 1 ∨ 𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 1) ∧ 𝑛𝑖𝑡 < 𝑛} 
(5) 
Reference prices can be differentiated into internal and external reference prices (Hu et al. 2016; Liu and 
Zhang 2006; McCarville et al. 1993). The internal reference price 𝐼𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 reflects a customer’s memories for 
prices from past or current purchase occasions (Johnson and Cui 2013; Mazumdar et al. 2005). The 
external reference price 𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 usually refers to price information that is available externally (Mazumdar et 
al. 2005). It depicts a regular or base price that a product is usually sold at (Koschate-Fischer and Wüllner 
2017; Kopalle and Lindsey-Mullikin 2003; Krishna et al. 2002).  
The internal reference price 𝐼𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡  of a customer gets updated when he visits the store. Research 
concerning reference prices is not unequivocal. Some papers use all offered prices and exponentially 
smooth them when calculating 𝐼𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 (e.g. Hu et al. 2016; Wang 2016). Others argue that there is a lack of 
substantial evidence for exponentially smoothed average prices in behavioural research (Koschate-Fischer 
and Wüllner 2017; Nasiry and Popescu 2011) and that customers are unlikely to remember past offerings 
well except for the very last purchase situation (Krishnamurthi and Phillips 1992). We follow the former 
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and exponentially smooth the internal reference price 𝐼𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 that gets updated when the customer visits the 
store. The smoothing factor 𝜓𝑖 ∈ [0,1] is modelled on an individual level and determines a customer’s 
memory for price offerings in the past. The parameter 𝜓𝑖  is also called assimilation parameter that 
determines a customer’s sensitivity to differences between the newly offered price 𝑝𝑖𝑡 and the old internal 
reference price 𝐼𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 (Mazumdar et al. 2005). For 𝜓𝑖 = 1 a customer only remembers the very last price 
offered to him (Wang 2016) or, in other words, completely assimilates new prices (Mazumdar et al. 2005). 
Let 𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡 ∈ {0,1} denote if customer 𝑖 has already visited the store at least once until time step 𝑡. If the 
customer visits the store for the first time at time step t, his internal reference price will equal the offered 
price: 𝐼𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑝𝑖𝑡. On successive visits the 𝐼𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 will be updated in the following way:   
𝐼𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 = {
𝐼𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 𝑖𝑓 𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 0
𝐼𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 +𝜓𝑖 ⋅ (𝑝𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑅𝑃𝑡−1) 𝑖𝑓 𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 1
  ,     𝑡 ≥ 2,     ∀𝑖 ∈ {1,… , 𝐼: 𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 1} (6) 
In our model, the external reference price 𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 is based on the prices that customer 𝑖 observes on the 
market at a given time step 𝑡. A customer is only aware of prices offered to other customers in the network 
if they have been passed to him by WOM. For this, let 𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∈ {0,1} denote if customer 𝑖 has received price 
information from customer 𝑗 at time step 𝑡, i.e. if he knows about the price 𝑝𝑗𝑡 paid by the customer 𝑗 at 
the same time step (𝑏𝑗𝑡 = 1). Furthermore, let 𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑡 ∈ {0,1} denote if customer 𝑖 has already been activated 
by WOM at least once until time step 𝑡.  
According to the theory of social comparison, customers focus more on the prices paid by customers who 
are in a comparable situation (Bloch and Quérou 2013). It is conceivable that to some extent people accept 
price differences for certain groups like students or retired people. In analogy to the above-defined 
assimilation parameter, a customer’s old 𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 should change depending on the similarity to the sender 
from whom he has obtained price information. More (less) similar customers have a greater (smaller) 
influence on the formation of his updated external reference price 𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡. To put it differently, the receiver 
𝑖’s similarity 𝑠𝑔𝑖𝑔𝑗 to a sender 𝑗 determines the degree of assimilation of the sender’s price. We assume that 
the interaction between customer 𝑖 and 𝑗 suffices for an adequate assessment of the mutual similarity. In 
case of multiple received prices, the average of all similarity-weighted price differences will be used for 
updating his external reference price. If the obtained prices are from highly dissimilar customers, the 
external reference price will hardly be modified. If a customer gets activated by WOM for the first time, 
his external reference price will correspond to the average of the prices known to him: 𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 =
(∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 ⋅ 𝑝𝑗𝑡𝑗∈{1,…,𝐼}\𝑖 )/(∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑗∈{1,…,𝐼}\𝑖 ). Afterwards, we define the updating of 𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 as: 
𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 = {
𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 𝑖𝑓 𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 0
𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡−1 +
∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 ⋅ 𝑠𝑔𝑖𝑔𝑗 ⋅ (𝑝𝑗𝑡 − 𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡−1)𝑗∈{1,…,𝐼}\𝑖
∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑗∈{1,…,𝐼}\𝑖
𝑖𝑓 𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 1
  , 
  𝑡 ≥ 2,     ∀𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝐼: 𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 1} 
(7) 
The actual reference price 𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡, to which the customer adapts his 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 to, is based on the internal and 
external reference price. 𝐼𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 and 𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 are known to the customer as soon as he has visited the store or 
has been activated by WOM respectively. If both conditions are met, the customer is aware of both 
reference prices. In this case, the relative weight between both reference prices is determined by the 
customer’s price sensitivity (Koschate-Fischer and Wüllner 2017; Mazumdar et al. 2005; Krishnan et al. 
2013; Murthi et al. 2012; Moon et al. 2006) that shall be denoted by 𝜂, 0 ≤ 𝜂 ≤ 1. Highly price sensitive 
customers (𝜂 → 1) will mainly look at the prices that others pay when defining their reference price. 
Customers are more likely to make a purchase if they personally benefit from discriminatory pricing 
(Richards et al. 2016). We therefore assume that the price sensitivity 𝜂 only plays a role if other customers 
pay less (i.e. 𝐼𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 > 𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡). If the customer is privileged or at least equally served in his perception of 
prices (i.e. 𝐼𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡), he will pick his internal reference price as 𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 which will make an increase of 
his 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 and thereby a purchase more likely. 
𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 =
{
 
 
 
 
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 0 ∧ 𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 0
𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 0 ∧ 𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 1
𝐼𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 1 ∧ 𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 0
𝐼𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 1 ∧ 𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 1 ∧ 𝐼𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 ≤ 𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝜂 ⋅ 𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 + (1 − 𝜂) ⋅ 𝐼𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 1 ∧ 𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑡 = 1 ∧ 𝐼𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 > 𝐸𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡
 (8) 
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Model Solution 
Applied Solution Methods 
The proposed decision model describes in a formalised way the profit caused by the seller’s pricing 
decision depicted in the price matrix 𝑃𝑀 ∈ ℝ+
𝐺𝑥𝑊. The determination of the optimal elements of the price 
matrix is complex because of the profound interdependencies and the model’s stochastic variables that for 
example concern the customers’ store visiting and purchase behaviour. Therefore, an analytical solution 
cannot be implemented for practical problem sizes. To provide numerical solutions to pricing decisions 
that today’s online stores are confronted with, we propose the deployment of an evolution strategy as an 
artificial intelligence solution method often used for continuous optimisation problems (Emmerich et al. 
2018). We benchmark it against other AI methods (simulated annealing and particle swarm optimisation) 
and non-AI methods (greedy algorithm and Monte Carlo simulation). Evolution strategies are based on an 
analogy to biological processes of genetic selection of the best suited features. Starting with a set of 
individuals (population) that are characterised by their genetic attributes, subsets are chosen to simulate a 
reproduction procedure for generating new individuals and testing their fitness (Emmerich et al. 2018). 
To implement an evolution strategy for our decision problem, first an operationalisation of an individual 
is needed. Because an individual represents a possible solution to our pricing decision model, it can be 
constructed as a matrix of the dimensions 𝐺𝑥𝑊 containing positive numerical values depicting the prices 
of the seller. The fitness of an individual is determined by the profit it generates in a given scenario. In 
order to obtain representative fitness values in a stochastic environment, the simulation of an individual’s 
financial outcome needs to be conducted multiple times. Second, the genetic processes of generating new 
individuals and determining the survival conditions in the transition to the next generation need to be 
defined. The evolution strategy (ES) was conducted as (𝜇𝐸𝑆 + 𝜆𝐸𝑆)-ES where 𝜇𝐸𝑆 denotes the number of 
parental individuals in each generation. By various mutation and recombination methods the parents are 
used to generate children whose number is represented by 𝜆𝐸𝑆.We parameterised the evolution strategy 
with  𝜇𝐸𝑆 = 10 parents where each parent generated multiple children by mutating its elements with a 
step size of 𝜎𝐸𝑆 = 5. To reduce the risk of getting trapped in a local optimum, additional children were 
generated by recombining randomly selected parents. To enrich the population with good genes, a 
“kindergarten” was added where three randomly created individuals were protected for five generations. 
In total, 𝜆𝐸𝑆 = 139 children were generated in each generation whose fitness was calculated according to 
equation (1). For all scenarios the evolution strategy was stopped after 100 generations. Afterwards the 
best-performing individual among the survivors was identified representing the found solution to the 
seller’s decision problem. The particle swarm optimisation mimics animal swarm behaviour found in 
nature such as the movement of birds. Animals belonging to the swarm are in the optimisation process 
represented by so-called particles denoting possible solutions that move around in the problem’s solution 
space. The velocity of each particle’s movement depends on the previous velocity, the personally found 
best position in the solution space, and the global best position identified by the swarm. (Bonyadi et al. 
2014) Simulated annealing is based on the metallurgical annealing process and has the advantage of being 
able to leave local optima. Depending on a decreasing temperature level that determines the step size and 
the currently known best solution, a trial solution is generated and evaluated. If it performs better, it is 
henceforth defined as the best known solution. In the converse case, it may still be defined as the so far 
best-performing solution with a given probability that decreases with the temperature. (Dowsland et al. 
2012) As a non-AI solution method a greedy algorithm was tested where the prices of a possible solution 
were consecutively optimised. We also performed a Monte Carlo simulation where potential solutions 
were randomly generated. The solutions of all tested methods were evaluated according to their fitness. 
To improve the quality of the found solutions, scenario-adjusted lower and upper boundaries were 
defined for the solution space. To achieve performance comparability, each solution method was granted 
approximately the same simulation time as the evolution strategy. The statistics for the best found 
solutions were calculated by re-conducting their fitness calculation 1.000 times. The profits generated by 
these solutions provide the basis for the numerical analysis.  
Parameterisation and Scenario Development 
To examine the performance of the solution method and to analyse different scenarios we modelled and 
solved a numeric example for an exemplary online store. Some of the parameters constituting the 
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numerical example were fixed and others were varied for carrying out a sensitivity analysis. The former 
include, for instance, a fixed time horizon of 𝑇 = 100 and the customer segmentation. We define three 
different customer groups 𝐴 , 𝐵 , and 𝐶  that represent the store’s customer segment structure. We 
normalised the number of potential buyers to 100 where 10% belong to group 𝐴, 20% to group 𝐵, and 70% 
to group 𝐶. The customer groups are denoted by the indices 𝑔 ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Each group 𝑔 has a similarity of 
𝑠𝑔𝑔 = 1 to itself. The group of 𝐴 customers has a similarity of 𝑠12 = 𝑠21 = 0.5 and 𝑠13 = 𝑠31 = 0.1 to the 
groups of 𝐵 and 𝐶  customers respectively. The groups of 𝐵 and 𝐶  customers have a similarity of 𝑠23 =
𝑠32 = 0.5 to each other. The customers of group 𝐴 represent the seller’s most loyal customers and have a 
significantly higher initial willingness-to-pay 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖0. To generate 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖0 we introduce a market price level 
𝑝𝑙 = 100 that can be interpreted as a scaling factor and is used for defining boundaries [0, 3 ⋅ 𝑝𝑙] for the 
decision problem’s solution space. The values for 𝐴 customers are drawn from a normal distribution with 
an expected value of 𝜇(𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖0) = 2 ⋅ 𝑝𝑙. Customers of group 𝐵 have a considerably lower willingness-to-
pay with 𝜇(𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖0) = 1.25 ⋅ 𝑝𝑙. The least loyal customers belong to group 𝐶 with 𝜇(𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖0) = 𝑝𝑙. For all 
groups the standard deviation is 𝜎(𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖0) = 5 . The upper limit of the customers is fixed at 
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖
𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 1.1 ⋅ 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖0. The smoothing factor is set to 𝜓𝑖 = 0.9 so that new offered prices are quickly 
adopted as internal reference prices by the customers. The marginal costs for each sold product are 𝑐 = 0. 
The flexibility parameter 𝜀?̃?𝑡  for small differences between the offered price and the customer’s 
willingness-to-pay is drawn from a right-sided triangular distribution between 0 and 3. This makes a 
purchase more likely if the offered price is greater than the willingness-to-pay only by a small amount. 
The greater the difference is, the less likely the customer will make a purchase. Furthermore, we chose 
𝜙 = 0.5 ⋅ 𝑝𝑙 so that the difference between 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 and 𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 has to be less than 50 in order to initiate an 
increase of 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡. The price sensitivity was set to 𝜂 = 0.8 inducing customers to have a low tolerance for 
similar customers paying less.  
The set of varied model parameters comprises the customer visit frequency, loss aversion, and price 
transparency on the market resulting from word of mouth. To test different visit frequencies, the base 
level for the expected duration until the next store visit is varied: 𝜆 ∈ {1, 5, 20}. For instance, 𝜆 = 20 
represents a low visit frequency and means that without modification of the customer arrival times (i.e. 
𝜆𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆) each customer would visit the store every 20 time steps. The expected duration 𝜆𝑖𝑡 is modified 
depending on the weighted difference between the reference price and willingness-to-pay. As a weighting 
factor we chose 0.5, meaning that a customer with an encountered difference of 𝑅𝑃𝑖𝑡 −𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 10 will 
increase his expected duration 𝜆𝑖𝑡 until the next store visit by 10 ∙ 0.5 = 5 time steps. For generating the 
actual random durations a discrete geometric distribution is used. In the following, we will refer to the 
visit frequency scenarios as high visit frequency (HF), medium visit frequency (MF), and low visit 
frequency (LF). To test various degrees of loss aversion, we set the increasing adaptation speed of the 
willingness-to-pay to 𝛽 = 0.1 and varied the decreasing speed 𝛼 ∈ {0.2, 0.5, 1}. Greater values of 𝛼 lead to 
higher degrees of loss aversion where customers reduce their willingness-to-pay faster upon observing 
cheaper prices. These three cases will be called low loss aversion (LLA), medium loss aversion (MLA), and 
high loss aversion (HLA). In order to examine the effects of different price transparency levels, an 
operationalisation of the binary WOM reception indicator 𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 is needed. For mimicking a real social 
network environment for the store’s customers, we developed an analogous WOM model comprising the 
customer interaction in the following way. Real social networks are characterised by clustered areas in 
which the customers are highly connected to each other and so-called bridges or weak ties that represent 
connections between the clusters leading to a faster information dissemination in the network (Onnela et 
al. 2007; Cowan and Jonard 2004). An artificial network that shares these characteristics is the small 
world network model of Watts and Strogatz (1998). For creating small world networks, we used 𝐼 = 1000 
as the number of vertices in the graph, 𝑙𝑝 = 10 as the lattice parameter, and a rewiring probability of 
𝑟 = 0.1. Messages omitted in social networks are subject to decay depending on a half-life (Nugroho et al. 
2015) that determines the distance 𝛿 it reaches in the network. We define the distance as the longest 
possible walk originating from the sender vertex. For 𝛿 = 1  a sender would only reach his directly 
connected neighbours, whereas for 𝛿 = 2 his second-degree neighbours would be informed, too and so 
forth. Messages with a high half-life have a low distance because they quickly lose their topicality and 
thereby reach only a small fraction of the network and vice versa. We define 𝜔 ∈ [0.1] as the edge pass-
through probability in the identified walks. If a random receiver 𝑖 is two edges away from the sender 𝑗, the 
likelihood that 𝑖  knows of 𝑗 ’s price 𝑝𝑗𝑡  equals 𝜔
2 . Both potential buyers and non-buyers can equally 
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forward price information they received from others, even while being outside the store. In a conducted 
pre-test, for different values of 𝛿  and 𝜔  we numerically determined the likelihood of 𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡(𝛿, 𝜔) = 1 
describing that a randomly selected customer 𝑖 receives the message sent by a likewise randomly selected 
distinct customer 𝑗. For the following experiments we chose 𝛿 = 6 and 𝜔 ∈ {0, 0.25, 0.4, 0.55, 1} leading 
to rounded price transparencies 0%, 21%, 54%, 82%, and 100% respectively. Hereafter, these scenarios 
will be referred to as no price transparency (NT), low price transparency (LT), medium price transparency 
(MT), high price transparency (HT), and full price transparency (FT). 
Numerical Analysis 
For validating the plausibility of the model and the purpose of comparison, we define uniform pricing 
(UP) as our benchmark case where no price differentiation occurs. With UP there is only one group that 
includes all customers who are offered only one price (𝐺 = 1,𝑊 = 1). The profits generated by the 
evolution strategy for UP are depicted in Figure 1a/b/c and vary between 8264.41 and 9212.62. The 
standard error (SE) in all depicted UP scenarios ranged from 4.38 to 19.68. The graphs show that the loss 
aversion of the customers has no effect on the outcome since all customers are offered the same price. The 
price transparency, on the other hand, seems to have a solely positive impact on the profit. However, it 
can only accrue if there is a low visit frequency on the market (𝜆 = 20). For higher visit frequencies there 
is no observable effect of the price transparency. In all examined UP scenarios the evolution strategy 
suggested setting approximately the same price. The mean of all offered prices was 94.3 with a standard 
deviation of 0.5. The prices slightly increased with the visit frequency (LF: 93.7, MF: 94.4, HF: 94.7).  
 
Figure 1. Profits for Uniform Pricing and Price Discrimination Strategies 
 
To test the effects of differential pricing for each group 𝑔, we define different price discrimination (PD) 
strategies that differ in terms of available price subgroups 𝑊 ∈ {1, 3} that each group 𝑔’s visitors are 
assigned to depending on their number of previous visits. These strategies will be called PD1 and PD3 
respectively where the level of price individualisation increases with the number of available prices per 
group. Their profits are also depicted in Figure 1 for which the SE ranged from 4.39 to 20.82 and 2.34 and 
82.90 respectively. The SE decreased with the visit frequency and was smaller for higher visit frequencies. 
PD1 can be described as a “one price per group” strategy which is equivalent to classical group pricing. As 
shown in Figure 1d/e/f, PD1 always outperforms UP significantly if there is no price transparency. The 
degree of loss aversion does not matter in this case since customers are only aware of their own prices. 
Price transparency has a solely positive impact on the profit in cases of low visit frequency and low loss 
aversion. In the other cases of PD1, the existence of price transparency leads to lower profit as compared 
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to the no transparency case. The loss aversion seems to have a moderating influence. The higher the loss 
aversion is, the smaller is the generated profit and the more PD1 forfeits its superiority compared to UP 
under transparency. One possible explanation for this are the two opposing effects of WOM: with lower 
(higher) prices, more (less) customers are attracted to visiting the store but their willingness-to-pay 
decreases (increases). That means WOM may increase the profit by attracting customers to visit the store 
sooner than originally planned or more often. Simultaneously, customers may lower their willingness-to-
pay if they observe lower prices of other customers on the market resulting in less profit. The higher the 
loss aversion of the customers is, the more pronounced is the latter negative effect of WOM. This explains 
why the profit-increasing effect in Figure 1d is only observable in the cases of low loss aversion, but not in 
the medium and high loss aversion scenarios where the negative effect outweighs the positive one because 
of the faster decreasing of the willingness-to-pay. In some cases of high loss aversion, the evolution 
strategy was able to find out that differential pricing in the form of PD1 is counter-productive and 
suggested offering the same price (≈94) to all groups equalling the UP strategy. The PD3 strategy provides 
three subgroups per group and thereby distinguishes between first-time and second-time returning 
customers. Figure 1g/h/i reveal that in comparison to PD1, the application of PD3 leads to greater profits 
and the price transparency does not result in a significant reduction of the profit. The profits generated in 
the no transparency case can mostly be maintained for higher transparency levels. Furthermore, the 
negative effects of the loss aversion seem to be lessened to the extent that even for highly loss aversive 
customers PD3 is able to outperform the UP strategy. The results also indicate that the influence of loss 
aversion on the profit gets lessened with increasing visit frequency which seems to counterbalance the 
impact of higher loss aversion. The experiments shown in Figure 1 were also re-conducted with the other 
solution methods with similar SE ranges. All methods suggested approximately the same prices for UP 
leading to the same profits. For PD1 all methods were able to find equivalent solutions for customers with 
low loss aversion except for simulated annealing which generated poorer results than UP in some price 
transparency cases. In the higher loss aversion cases of PD1, the other methods performed worse than the 
evolution strategy by suggesting solutions that fell below the UP curve generating profits close to 8.000. 
Similar observations were made for PD3 where the other methods lead to smaller profits particularly in 
the high loss aversion and low visit frequency scenarios as compared to the evolution strategy. Among the 
tested solution methods, the particle swarm optimisation was the closest to the evolution strategy in terms 
of generated profits.  
 
Figure 2. Benchmark of the Evolution Strategy Against Other Solution Methods 
 
For determining the performance of the solution methods in a greater solution space, we tested them on a 
price discrimination strategy with 𝑊 = 6 prices per group which we will refer to as PD6. The profits of 
PD3 and PD6 generated by the applied solution methods in selected scenarios are depicted in Figure 2 
with their 95% confidence intervals. The SE ranged from 1.76 to 94.13 for PD3 and slightly increased for 
PD6 where it varied between 1.64 and 110.99. When the non-AI solution methods are compared to each 
other, it transpires that in most of the shown cases the greedy algorithm obtained significantly better 
results than the Monte Carlo simulation. This applies in particular to the high visit frequency cases. In 
most cases the greatest profits are generated either by the evolution strategy or the particle swarm 
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optimisation. As the third AI solution method, simulated annealing performed significantly worse and in 
most cases generated even less profit than the non-AI methods suggesting that its optimisation approach 
does not suit the given problem structure. We tested the differences for statistical significance with a t-test 
(*, **, *** = 𝑝 <  0.05, 𝑝 <  0.01, 𝑝 < 0.001 respectively, ns = not significant). In terms of generated profits 
with PD3, the evolution strategy was on average able to outperform the Monte Carlo simulation 
(+6.45%***), greedy algorithm (+3.40%**), simulated annealing (+10.55%***), and particle swarm 
optimisation (+1.16%ns). The differences increased with PD6 in the greater solution space and the 
evolution strategy was able to consolidate its lead in particular over the Monte Carlo simulation 
(+8.29%***) and greedy algorithm (+5.42%***). Smaller difference changes were observed for simulated 
annealing (+11.58%***) and the particle swarm optimisation (+1.19%ns).  
 Case  
(LF) 
PD1   PD3     Case  
(HF) 
PD1  PD3     
Profit    w = 1 Profit   w = 1    w = 2   w = 3 Profit    w = 1 Profit    w = 1    w = 2    w = 3 
A 
LLA 
NT 
9536 
(89.7) 
186 (9.1) 
9921 
(90.2) 
SL 193 (8.5) 189 (0.5) 144 (0.0) 
LLA 
NT 
10607 
(98.2) 
192 (9.9) 
11231 
(99.5) 
PU 225 (0.0) 200 (7.9) 186 (2.0) 
B 116 (18.0) SL 125 (11.2) 119 (5.5) 116 (1.1) 119 (19.5) SL 125 (12.2) 121 (5.2) 113 (2.6) 
C 92 (62.6) SL 99 (43.6) 86 (19.7) 86 (0.0) 93 (68.7) CY 101 (32.9) 128 (0.0) 95 (36.6) 
A 
LLA 
LT 
9893 
(96.0) 
149 (9.7) 
10655 
(94.4) 
CY 174 (8.5) 220 (0.0) 125 (1.2) 
LLA 
LT 
10131 
(96.6) 
172 (8.6) 
11417 
(99.5) 
SL 181 (9.4) 136 (0.6) 136 (0.0) 
B 111 (19.2) SL 123 (14.9) 113 (4.8) 113 (0.0) 112 (19.8) SL 127 (9.7) 122 (7.5) 114 (2.8) 
C 94 (67.2) PU 129 (0.0) 104 (49.7) 96 (15.3) 94 (68.1) PU 136 (0.0) 107 (40.0) 99 (29.5) 
A 
LLA 
MT 
9951 
(96.2) 
149 (9.9) 
10590 
(93.1) 
SL 185 (5.4) 155 (4.4) 155 (0.0) 
LLA 
MT 
10169 
(97.0) 
164 (9.2) 
11537 
(99.3) 
SL 192 (9.1) 163 (0.9) 163 (0.0) 
B 111 (19.1) CY 122 (16.7) 166 (0.0) 102 (2.7) 114 (19.4) SL 137 (0.5) 126 (14.0) 120 (5.4) 
C 95 (67.2) PU 131 (0.0) 105 (46.6) 97 (17.2) 94 (68.3) PU 134 (0.0) 106 (40.7) 99 (28.7) 
A 
LLA 
HT 
9933 
(95.3) 
149 (9.9) 
10525 
(90.4) 
CY 190 (8.6) 237 (0.0) 170 (0.9) 
LLA 
HT 
10132 
(96.3) 
173 (8.5) 
11660 
(99.1) 
SL 192 (9.4) 175 (0.6) 175 (0.0) 
B 112 (19.0) PU 162 (0.0) 127 (17.0) 105 (1.8) 114 (19.6) PU 160 (0.0) 131 (13.8) 124 (6.1) 
C 95 (66.4) PU 135 (0.0) 109 (30.0) 98 (32.2) 94 (68.3) PU 138 (0.0) 107 (40.6) 100 (28.6) 
A 
LLA 
FT 
9992 
(96.6) 
150 (9.8) 
10411 
(89.8) 
CY 184 (9.4) 205 (0.0) 178 (0.4) 
LLA 
FT 
10130 
(96.7) 
173 (8.4) 
11614 
(99.3) 
SL 190 (9.7) 157 (0.3) 157 (0.0) 
B 112 (19.2) SL 137 (1.6) 128 (10.3) 119 (6.7) 113 (19.8) PU 155 (0.0) 131 (11.7) 123 (8.2) 
C 94 (67.6) PU 136 (0.0) 110 (23.0) 98 (38.5) 94 (68.5) PU 137 (0.0) 106 (42.9) 99 (26.6) 
A 
HLA 
NT 
9559 
(89.7) 
190 (9.0) 
10030 
(90.4) 
SL 198 (6.5) 190 (2.4) 186 (0.1) 
HLA 
NT 
10602 
(97.9) 
193 (9.8) 
11275 
(99.5) 
SL 204 (3.0) 218 (0.0) 194 (6.9) 
B 116 (18.0) SL 122 (14.4) 114 (3.7) 82 (0.1) 118 (19.5) CY 126 (9.6) 161 (0.0) 122 (10.2) 
C 92 (62.7) SL 98 (46.2) 92 (15.7) 83 (1.3) 93 (68.6) SL 105 (16.0) 99 (31.3) 92 (22.5) 
A 
HLA 
LT 
9057 
(97.4) 
94 (9.6) 
10261 
(91.0) 
SL 192 (7.5) 115 (1.7) 115 (0.0) 
HLA 
LT 
9281 
(93.3) 
190 (4.9) 
11373 
(99.5) 
SL 193 (8.9) 149 (0.8) 91 (0.3) 
B 93 (19.9) PU 175 (0.0) 127 (10.1) 109 (8.1) 96 (20.0) PU 161 (0.0) 124 (17.4) 102 (2.6) 
C 93 (67.9) PU 242 (0.0) 108 (25.8) 98 (37.8) 94 (68.3) PU 132 (0.0) 107 (33.1) 98 (36.4) 
A 
HLA 
MT 
9038 
(96.0) 
94 (10.0) 
10268 
(89.9) 
CY 193 (7.7) 256 (0.0) 162 (1.1) 
HLA 
MT 
9278 
(92.2) 
189 (5.0) 
11506 
(99.4) 
SL 192 (8.6) 188 (0.3) 142 (1.1) 
B 94 (19.7) PU 259 (0.0) 128 (13.0) 118 (4.9) 99 (19.2) PU 153 (0.0) 126 (16.5) 111 (3.5) 
C 94 (66.3) PU 188 (0.0) 106 (30.5) 96 (32.7) 95 (68.0) PU 138 (0.0) 107 (40.6) 99 (28.8) 
A 
HLA 
HT 
9063 
(97.1) 
93 (10.0) 
10062 
(88.0) 
SL 187 (8.0) 169 (0.9) 169 (0.0) 
HLA 
HT 
9302 
(91.8) 
191 (5.0) 
11512 
(98.9) 
SL 194 (8.3) 186 (1.4) 170 (0.4) 
B 94 (19.6) PU 217 (0.0) 130 (10.4) 118 (7.0) 100 (19.3) PU 158 (0.0) 172 (0.0) 125 (19.8) 
C 93 (67.5) PU 184 (0.0) 106 (28.2) 97 (33.5) 95 (67.5) PU 138 (0.0) 109 (26.0) 99 (43.1) 
A 
HLA 
FT 
9010 
(95.4) 
95 (9.7) 
10035 
(88.9) 
SL 181 (6.9) 146 (2.0) 119 (0.2) 
HLA 
FT 
9289 
(92.1) 
188 (5.0) 
11547 
(98.6) 
SL 195 (7.9) 180 (1.4) 166 (0.5) 
B 95 (19.6) PU 227 (0.0) 127 (13.8) 103 (4.5) 100 (19.3) PU 161 (0.0) 129 (14.3) 122 (5.5) 
C 94 (66.1) PU 141 (0.0) 108 (28.5) 96 (33.0) 95 (67.8) PU 139 (0.0) 108 (32.1) 100 (36.9) 
Table 2. Rounded Prices (Number of Sales) for Price Discrimination in Selected Scenarios 
Table 2 shows the prices found by the evolution strategy in selected scenarios where low and high 
customer visit frequencies are compared in terms of low and high loss aversion. The average number of 
sales per price is given in parentheses. The profits increase from low to high visit frequency and decrease 
from low to high loss aversion, i.e. the highest profits can be expected in high visit frequency and low loss 
aversion scenarios. When PD1 is considered in scenarios of low visit frequency and high loss aversion, it 
should only be applied if there is no price transparency. If transparency exists in these scenarios, the 
deployment of PD1 is counter-productive and price discrimination should be entirely dispensed by the 
seller in favour of uniform pricing. In the other cases shown in Table 2 the application of PD1 can still be 
financially worthwhile even if WOM cannot be prevented. If price transparency exists in cases of low loss 
aversion, the offered prices to 𝐴 customers should be lowered while the prices for 𝐵 and 𝐶 should remain 
fairly constant. This applies to both low and high visit frequency scenarios. A peculiarity can be seen for 
high visit frequency when low and high loss aversion scenarios are compared to each other. The prices of 
𝐴 customers are higher in the high loss aversion scenarios, while the prices of 𝐵 and 𝐶 are slightly reduced 
and remain constant respectively. This leads to a drop in sales for 𝐴 customers, but keeps the number of 𝐵 
and 𝐶 buyers at a high level. In the price structures of PD3 three different types of pricing schemes can be 
identified. Successive Lowering (SL) of prices is applied if the seller sets a high initial price to first serve 
customers with a high willingness-to-pay and then monotonically decreases the price to sell to those with 
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a lower willingness-to-pay. In the Pull Up (PU) scheme the seller sets one or more initial price as high as 
to hinder visitors from buying the product at their first visits. The high price increases the customers’ 
willingness-to-pay so that they can be charged higher prices on subsequent visits. The prices are 
successively lowered after the pulling up. The Cyclic (CY) scheme differs from the PU strategy in that it 
offers a high price intended to pull up the willingness-to-pay not on the first but on a later visit. It also 
presupposes that sales were realised by preceding prices. Table 2 reveals that for 𝐴 customers the SL 
strategy should be applied in all high visit frequency cases except for one (LLA HT) where the PU strategy 
is suggested. In low visit frequency cases a mix of SL and CY is found to be optimal, where CY is suggested 
more often in low loss aversion scenarios. Price transparency seems to have only a small impact on the 
strategy type for 𝐴 customers for whom in 75% of the cases SL is suggested. The situation is different for B 
customers where SL is mostly suggested only for relatively low levels of price transparency (NT or LT). 
For higher levels of price transparency, the PU strategy is recommended more frequently. For 𝐶 
customers the price transparency exhibits an even higher degree of separation precision in regard to 
selecting the correct strategy type. In NT scenarios SL should be adopted by the seller except for the HF 
LLA case where CY is suggested. In cases of price transparency, PU is applied without exception. To 
summarise, the impact of price transparency increases from 𝐴  to 𝐶  customers. If there is no price 
transparency, SL is the dominant type for all customers. If price transparency exists, the PU strategy is the 
most recommended type for 𝐵 and 𝐶 customers. The price structures shown in Table 2 also explain the 
aforementioned rather surprising result that a greater degree of price discrimination diminishes the 
effects of loss aversion. For this we compared the prices of PD1 and PD3 in the high visit frequency 
scenarios for highly loss aversive customers with medium price transparency (HF HLA MT). With the PD1 
strategy only 50% of 𝐴 customers buy the product at a relatively high price. The other half adapts their 
willingness-to-pay to a much lower level due to the lower prices of 𝐵 and 𝐶 customers and refuses to pay a 
significantly higher price. The deployment of PD3 increases the profit by 24.01% as compared to PD1. For 
accomplishing this, first 𝐴 customers should be served by applying the SL scheme. In the meantime, 𝐵 
and 𝐶 customers should be hindered from making a purchase by offering them high first-time visitor 
prices for two reasons: (1) their willingness-to-pay increases due to the PU strategy and (2) the 
willingness-to-pay of 𝐴 customers does not decrease immediately as it is the case with PD1. A similar 
policy is suggested for the equivalent low visit frequency scenario (LF HLA MT).  
Discussion 
Conclusion 
One of the most relevant and difficult decisions for firms is the adequate pricing of its products and 
services. In this context, Big Data opens up new opportunities for online stores (Bourreau et al. 2017). The 
more information a seller collects about her customers, the better she will be able to estimate their 
individual willingness-to-pay in order to offer them tailored prices. When offering individualised prices, 
WOM can have adverse consequences for the seller. Customers could feel disadvantaged if their peers pay 
less for the same product and react by lowering the willingness-to-pay. However, WOM may also have a 
favourable impact by attracting new customers. As an answer to our first research question RQ1 we 
introduced a pricing decision model for an online seller who has profound knowledge about the static and 
dynamic data of arriving customers. The static customer data constitutes the similarity between 
customers and the dynamic data is represented by their store visit history. Both types of information are 
used by the seller to assign visitors to customer groups that are served different prices. WOM was 
incorporated into our model for enabling buyers to share their prices with directly and indirectly 
connected other network participants. The objective function of the model consists of the maximisation of 
the seller’s total profit depending on the prices to be offered. We investigated the performance of different 
pricing strategies that differed in their level of price individualisation. Our findings demonstrate that in 
many cases it is profitable to offer different prices to different customers. They also indicate that the 
negative influence of loss aversion can be neutralised by applying a pricing strategy with a higher degree 
of price discrimination which gives the seller more flexibility in adequately serving her customer base. 
Sometimes, it seems to be financially worthwhile to take the risk of customers lowering their willingness-
to-pay. We answered our second research question RQ2 by applying an evolution strategy and comparing 
it to other AI and non-AI solution methods. Our results show that AI methods have the potential to 
generate greater profits for the considered problem structure. Their advantage over non-AI methods 
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increases if pricing policies with a higher degree of price discrimination are deployed. However, our 
findings also indicate that not all AI methods are superior and should be thoroughly evaluated with regard 
to their suitability for solving the existing pricing decision problem, e.g. by testing more configurations for 
the optimisation approach.  
Managerial Implications 
Several managerial implications can be drawn from the examined scenarios in our study. Our results 
suggest that a pricing strategy with a higher degree of price discrimination performs best in all scenarios 
and should therefore be used preferably. But the higher the degree of price discrimination is, the more 
information about customers is required. If the collection and analysis of customer related information is 
limited (e.g. due to data protection by law), a firm might be compelled to use a strategy with a lower 
degree of price discrimination. In that case, firms should be cautious as price discrimination is not always 
beneficial and might lead to less profit as compared to UP. If firms have to some extent control over 
WOM, additional implications can be derived. If UP is applied by a firm, initiating WOM is only 
worthwhile if the visit frequency is low. For higher degrees of loss aversion and higher levels of visit 
frequency, WOM has mostly negative effects and should be avoided as much as possible. This is 
contrasted by the pricing strategies with a higher degree of price discrimination where WOM hardly 
changes the profits compared to the no transparency case. As demonstrated, in these cases WOM always 
benefits the firm by increasing the profits in all visit frequency scenarios. As regards setting prices, when 
the “one price per group” strategy (PD1) is applied in markets with low customer loss aversion, price 
transparency induces a price reduction for 𝐴 customers, while the prices of 𝐵 and 𝐶 customers are hardly 
influenced and should remain close to their initial average willingness-to-pay. This strategy is found to be 
optimal regardless of the customer visit frequency. Only if the seller is confronted with highly loss aversive 
customers who visit the store less frequently, PD1 should not be applied as UP is superior when price 
transparency exists. Applying a pricing strategy with multiple prices per group (e.g. PD3) gives the seller 
more flexibility in serving her customers. The Successive Lowering (SL) pricing scheme with higher prices 
at first followed by their continuous lowering is mostly suggested for 𝐴 customers regardless of the 
existing price transparency. The SL scheme is also the dominant strategy for 𝐶 customers but only if there 
is no price transparency. As soon as price transparency exists, for 𝐶 customers the Pull Up (PU) pricing 
scheme should be applied where high prices at initial visits increase the willingness-to-pay of customers 
by preventing them from purchasing the product. 𝐵 customers should also be served with the PU scheme 
but only for high levels of price transparency. For lower levels, SL or the Cyclic (CY) pricing scheme are 
suggested where high prices are offered to returning visitors for increasing their willingness-to-pay.  
Online stores may not always be able to accurately assess the characteristics of incoming customers. 
Erroneous assessments in this matter could lead to misjudgements of the customers’ correct group 
membership. Thereby, each pricing decision involves the risk of mistakes by offering the wrong prices to 
the wrong customers. For instance, a customer with a low willingness-to-pay could be mistakenly 
assigned to the group of customers who usually exhibit a high willingness-to-pay and get offered too high 
prices. In order to disclose how a (partially) wrong customer classification would influence the outcome, 
with our current model we tested the effects of misclassification based on static customer attributes. We 
re-ran the profit calculation with the differential prices the evolution strategy had suggested for PD3. In 
the test, with a misjudgement probability of 5%, 10%, and 30%, the seller assigned customers not to their 
fitting group but to a random other group. On average, the profits of price discrimination were reduced by 
3.22%**, 6.19%***, and 16.16%*** respectively. Although the profits decreased, differential pricing still 
performed significantly better than uniform pricing in the 5% and 10% misjudgement cases by 16.19%*** 
and 13.30%*** respectively. With a misjudgement probability of 30%, the generated profits exceeded 
uniform pricing’s results slightly by 1.22%ns. These results show that under a certain degree of uncertainty 
the profits are only marginally reduced und thereby indicate a robustness of the solutions against small to 
medium estimation errors. Only if customers are greatly misjudged in terms of group membership, the 
profits are substantially reduced but may still outperform the profits of uniform pricing.  
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
Our study aims to provide a conceptual basis for future research where the combined effects of different 
prices for different customers (price discrimination) and WOM are investigated more thoroughly. Because 
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the study explores new frontiers in this field, some limitations need to be considered when assessing its 
numerical results. First, the model should be extended by incorporating a “general acceptance factor” for 
price discrimination depicting the probability by which differential pricing is either accepted or rejected 
by customers. More than 50% of customers would refrain from shopping on Amazon if they got to know of 
individualised prices that are based on their willingness-to-pay (Kalka and Krämer 2016). The model 
should also be extended by the price (un-)fairness that is perceived by customers and the emotional 
reaction upon observing a high degree of price discrimination on the market (i.e. greater values of 𝐺 and 
𝑊). By this, a pricing strategy with a greater degree of price discrimination may not always perform better 
since customer dissatisfaction leads to negative WOM (Xia et al. 2004) which in turn may result in fewer 
sales. Second, more constellations regarding customer behaviour should be tested to investigate how the 
results change and ascertain when the positive influence of higher degrees of price discrimination on 
neutralising loss aversion and enhancing word of mouth effects is reduced. The model should be extended 
in a way that the varied model parameters in our experiments (e.g. loss aversion) do not apply to all 
customers but vary among customers or segments. It is conceivable that in general customers with low 
purchasing power have a smaller willingness-to-pay and are more sensitive against disadvantageous price 
discrimination resulting in a faster decrease of their willingness-to-pay. Applied to our current 
experiments, this would probably evoke a more strict serving order for the customer groups 𝐴, 𝐵, and 𝐶. 
In order to prevent the negative effects of high loss aversion among 𝐶 customers, at first 𝐴 and thereafter 
𝐵  customers should be lead to making purchases by offering prices that are higher than the mean 
willingness-to-pay of 𝐶  customers. Finally, in future investigations the importance of the correct 
assessment of customer characteristics should be examined in greater depth. The more diverse the 
customers are, the greater is the probability that they exhibit a different willingness-to-pay. This would 
justify a higher degree of customer separation leading to more customer groups and ultimately 
personalised pricing. In this respect, the impact of the estimation and classification errors on the profit 
could be amplified because the probability of offering the wrong price to the wrong customer would 
increase. This would lead price discrimination to lose its superiority at smaller estimation errors. Future 
research should therefore investigate when this point is reached for different constellations. It should also 
be investigated how the solution methods perform in optimising prices under uncertainty about 
customers, i.e. when customers are not correctly classified from the outset. 
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